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INTRODUCTION 
 
When does deference to administrative regulation, that seeks to 
prevent corporate fraud, cross the line from protecting the investor to 
adversely impacting capital markets and the US economy? On 
February 13, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
in a case of first impression for this circuit, addressed and upheld the 
validity of a treasury regulation that requires taxpayers to use the cash 
basis method of accounting when claiming deductions for interest 
payments made to foreign related parties.1 The only other circuit court 
of appeals to address this issue was a similarly-minded Third Circuit.2 
However, the reasoning and rationale of both the Seventh and Third 
Circuits marks a departure from the interpretation advocated by the 
lower Tax Court in Tate & Lyle.3 These appellate decisions evidence a 
continued trend of deference toward administrative regulation; all in 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, B.S. in Finance, 2004. 
1 Square D Co. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
2 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996). 
3 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656 (1994). 
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an effort for prevention of fraud and deceit in corporate America and 
protection of U.S. tax revenue.4 
In Square D Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of Treasury 
Regulation § 1.267(a)(3) (the “Regulation”) which requires U.S. 
corporations to utilize the cash basis method of accounting when 
deducting interest payments made to foreign related parties.5 This 
interpretation of the Regulation, given the potential for abuse and 
manipulation of the underlying transactions, places a necessary burden 
on U.S. companies who seek to globalize and engage in transactions 
with foreign parents or subsidiaries.6 Although the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation is correct, the reasoning supporting its decision is 
lacking. Practically, the level of deference shown in this decision 
marks the potential for a descent down a slippery slope in the 
regulation of U.S. companies with related foreign parties. The broad 
reach of the power of the Secretary, upheld by the Seventh Circuit, 
leaves open the question of how far U.S. companies can and should be 
regulated via administrative regulation. As an extreme example, if the 
Treasury Secretary can require companies to use cash basis accounting 
for these transactions, it does not seem to be outside the realm of 
possibility that the Secretary could issue a regulation disallowing 
interest deductions when such transactions are with foreign related 
parties. This wave of regulation is on the cusp of over regulation and, 
in light of increasing deference by courts, could result in discouraging 
U.S. participation in global finance leading to an adverse economic 
impact on the American companies and investors. 
The first section of this Note provides background on the 
differences between cash basis and accrual accounting methods and 
relevant reasons for utilizing each. The second section of this Note 
details the context of corporate regulation and its effect on American 
companies in a global market place. The third section of this Note 
contains an analysis of rationale for the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Tate & Lyle, 87 F.3d 99.  
5 Square D, 438 F.3d at 747. 
6 See id. 
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interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.267(a)-(3) in Square D 
Company v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and the 
relevant arguments against the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation. 
Finally, the last section of this Note concludes that although the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision was correct, based on the language and 
legislative history of the Code, the decision ignored several 
compelling arguments and should not be interpreted broadly to 
indicate that courts need not aim a critical eye toward administrative 
regulations aimed at preventing fraud. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) § 163(a) permits a 
taxpayer to take a deduction on all interest paid, and in certain 
circumstances on all interest accrued on indebtedness, within a taxable 
year.7 However, other provisions of the Code determine which of these 
two alternatives is applicable.8 Special rules govern deductions taken 
based on transactions with related parties.9 There are certain types of 
payments to related parties, for example interest payments, where a 
taxpayer can claim a deduction.10 The Code grants the Secretary of the 
Treasury the power to enact regulations regarding payments to foreign 
related parties and generally requires the cash basis method of 
accounting to be utilized when claiming a deduction based on a 
transaction with a foreign related party.11 Yet, there are a limited 
number of exceptions for certain types of payments to foreign related 
parties that do not have to utilize the cash basis method of 
accounting.12 
                                                 
7 I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006). 
8 I.R.C. § 448 (a), (b)(3) (2002). 
9 I.R.C. § 267 (2004) (noting in § 267 (a)(1) that generally, a taxpayer cannot 
take a deduction for a loss from a sale or exchange of property with a related 
person). 
10 I.R.C. § 267. 
11 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a)(3). 
12 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(c)(2) (2006) (noting items exempt from 
taxation by treaty). 
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The accrual method of accounting differs from the cash basis 
method in many notable respects.13 For example, under the “all events 
test” of the accrual method, a corporation must include “income and 
deductions in the taxable year in which the income or liability is fixed 
and can be determined with ‘reasonable accuracy.’”14 This differs from 
the cash basis method, which requires a corporation to include all 
income and deductions for the year in which the expenses are actually 
paid or received.15 In other words, cash basis and accrual accounting 
use different standards and criteria to determine when revenues and 
expenses must be recognized and recorded.16 Under the cash basis 
method, income and expenses are never counted until money comes in 
or goes out.17 Under the accrual method because transactions are 
counted when the event occurs, a company does not have to wait until 
the money is actually paid or received to record the transaction.18 The 
only meaningful difference between these two methods of accounting 
is in the timing of when transactions are accounted for or recorded.19 
A number of factors often determine the decision of whether a 
company will utilize the cash basis or accrual method of accounting. 
Initially, some corporations are required by the Code to utilize a 
                                                 
13 See Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 741-
42 (7th Cir. 2006). 
14 Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (2006)). 
15 I.R.C. § 446(c)(1), (2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(i). 
16 See Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C. 656, 668-69 
(1994). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. For example, if a corporation makes a purchase on credit, and takes the 
purchase in 2006, but does not pay for it until 2007 the way in which the expense is 
recorded varies between the cash basis and accrual methods of accounting. Using the 
cash basis method, you would record the expense in the 2007, the year when you 
actually paid for the purchase. However, under the accrual method, you would 
record the expense in 2006, when you take the purchase and incur the obligation to 
pay for it. 
19 The substance of this Note deals only with recording and reporting of 
transactions for purposes of taxation. It should be noted that many large companies 
record transactions, depreciation, etc. differently for purposes of management and 
make adjustments for purposes of taxation. 
4
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specific method of accounting.20 Businesses are required to use the 
accrual method in several instances: if the business has inventory; if 
the business is a C corporation; or if gross annual sales exceed five 
million dollars, with certain exceptions for personal service 
companies, sole proprietorships, farming business, and a few others.21 
However, accrual accounting can be more costly to maintain, 
because it requires the recording of more transactions.22 Cash basis 
accounting is easier for smaller, simpler companies that do not have a 
great deal of transactions or credit involved in their business models.23 
In deciding which method to utilize, corporations should consider the 
opinions and interests of their creditors, shareholders, and the 
reporting authorities including the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).24 
Generally, for large corporations and complex entities, cash basis may 
be inadequate because it not only fails to project future cash flows 
anticipated in the subsequent years by the corporation, but it also does 
not provide a proper analysis of the economics of the organization, 
thus hindering management decision making.25 
Critics of allowing accrual accounting for tax purposes cite the 
ease of manipulation in order to justify the imposition of a mandatory 
cash basis method.26 Because under the accrual method, cash basis is 
not tracked, it is easier for related parties to concoct situations where 
transactions are made strictly to avoid tax liability.27 For example, a 
parent corporation could make a loan to its subsidiary. The subsidiary 
could then deduct its interest payments every year as they accrue, but 
never actually pay that interest to the related party. This scenario is of 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 446, 448. 
21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 448. 
22 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-1 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See I.R.C.§ 448 
26 Karl S. Coplan, Protecting the Public Fisc: Fighting Accrual Abuse with 
Section 446 Discretion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 378 (March, 1983) (discussing the 
various ways that accrual accounting can be manipulated). 
27 Id. 
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all the more concern when the parent corporation is foreign because 
the IRS has no way to substantiate or confirm the eventual payment of 
the interest expense.28 Because the interest income is never taxed by 
the United States, as it would have been had the parent been a 
domestic corporation, it is difficult for the IRS to confirm that these 
transactions are anything more than shams to avoid tax liability.29 
In light of the concerns regarding manipulation and fraud based 
upon the difference between accrual and cash basis accounting 
methods, special rules and regulations have been promulgated to 
govern situations involving deductions based on transactions with a 
“related person or corporation.”30 Generally, a taxpayer is not 
                                                 
28 Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C. 656, 660 (1994) 
(citing Metzger Trust v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 75-76 (1981), affd. 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 
1982)). 
29 Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 660. 
30 The Code § 267(b) sets forth those relationships that qualify taxpayers as 
related parties.  
The relevant relationships include: (1) Members of a family; (2) 
An individual and a corporation more than 50 percent in value of 
the outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by 
or for such individual; (3) Two corporations which are members of 
the same controlled group (as defined in subsection (f)); (4) A 
grantor and a fiduciary of any trust; (5) a fiduciary of a trust and a 
fiduciary of another trust, if the same person is a grantor of both 
trusts; (6) a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of such trust; (7) 
a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of another trust, if the same 
person is a grantor of both trusts; (8) A fiduciary of a trust and a 
corporation more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock 
of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the trust or by 
or for a person who is a grantor of the trust; (9) A person and an 
organization to which section 501 (relating to certain educational 
and charitable organizations which are exempt from tax) applies 
and which is controlled directly or indirectly by such person or (if 
such person is an individual) by members of the family of such 
individual; (10) A corporation and a partnership if the same 
persons own – (A) more than 50 percent in value of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation; and (B) more than 50 percent 
of the capital interest, or the profits interest, in the partnership; 
(11) An S corporation and another S corporation if the same 
6
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permitted to take a deduction from its tax liability based on a loss from 
a sale of property when the parties are related.31 This provision does 
not stand as a bright-line rule barring all deductions on transactions 
with related parties.32 Code § 267(a)(2) permits deductions for 
payments made to related parties, but qualifies the deductions when 
the parties calculate tax liability based on different accounting 
systems.33 If the parties use different systems of accounting, the party 
seeking to utilize the deduction may only apply the deduction to its tax 
liability in the same year that the related party recognizes the 
income.34 Practically, this code provision requires the related parties to 
“[m]atch[]” one another’s systems of accounting.35 For example, if the 
related payee is on the cash basis, the taxpayer will only be able to 
claim the deduction when the money is actually paid, irrespective of 
whether or not the taxpayer generally reports on an accrual.36 
Conversely, if the related payee reports on an accrual, the taxpayer can 
only claim the deduction when the deduction accrues even if generally 
a cash basis reporter.37 
When one of the related parties is a foreign entity, the Code 
includes additional regulations to govern this relationship.38 In this 
field of regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”) is 
charged with promulgating and enacting regulations.39 Specifically, the 
Secretary shall be charged with disseminating regulations to apply the 
                                                                                                                   
persons own more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding 
stock in each corporation; or (12) An S corporation and a C 
corporation, if the same persons own more than 50 percent in 
value of the outstanding stock in each corporation. I.R.C. § 267(b). 
31 I.R.C. § 267(a)(1). 
32 See I.R.C. § 267 (a)(2). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 741-42 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
37 Id. at 741. 
38 See, e.g., I.R.C §§ 163(e)(3); 267. 
39 I.R.C. § 267(a)(3). 
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“‘matching principle of [ § 267 (a)(2)] in cases in which the person to 
whom the payment is made is not a United States person.’”40 Under 
this delegation of authority, the Secretary set forth a directive (the 
Regulation) that requires the use of the cash basis method of 
accounting, with certain carve-out exemptions, when a party seeks to 
claim deductions to a related foreign person.41 For example, the 
aforementioned regulation exemption “ ‘applies to any amount that is 
income of a related foreign person with respect to which the related 
foreign person is exempt from United States taxation on the amount 
owed pursuant to a treaty obligation of the United states,’ except for 
interest.”42 When a related foreign person accrues interest not 
effectively connected with the income generated43 by the foreign party, 
that interest is not exempt and is governed by the Regulations and 
thus, the cash basis method.44 
 
II. CONTEXT OF OTHER LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
 
U.S. corporations with foreign parent companies or foreign 
companies with substantial U.S. operations are a highly regulated 
group.45 Within the tax context, the early 1990’s began a wave of 
regulations applying to these foreign related parties, with a strict eye 
                                                 
40 Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 742 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting I.R.C. § 267(a)(3)) (alteration in original).  
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b)-(c)(2) (2006). 
42 Square D, 438 F.3d at 742 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(c)(2)). 
43 See, e.g., J.C. Lewenhaupt, 20 TC 151 (1953); A foreign corporation 
generally will not be subject to direct U.S. taxation unless it is “engaged in a trade or 
business in the United States.” Although the Code does no explicitly define the 
phrase “trade or business” the case law has been interpreted to suggest that activity 
will not constitute a “trade or business” unless it is “considerable, continuous, and 
regular.” Gregg D. Lemein, John D. McDonald, and Stewart R. Lipeles, Twists and 
Turns in the U.S. – Source Rules, Sep. 12, 2005, available at 
http://vcexperts.com/vce/news/buzz/archive. 
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b); Gregg D. Lemein, John D. McDonald, and 
Stewart R. Lipeles, Twists and Turns in the U.S. – Source Rules, Sep. 12, 2005, 
available at http://vcexperts.com/vce/news/buzz/archive.. 
45 See, e.g., I.R.C §§ 163; 237. 
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toward their purported tax liability.46 Several studies, commissioned 
by the IRS have indicated that foreign owned businesses operating in 
the U.S. have manipulated the tax structure to their advantage, to the 
tune of several billion dollars.47 Many legislators are advocates of 
stricter regulatory provisions on this subject because in terms of the 
American economy, specifically the tax structure, these corporations 
represent a giant “potential cash cow.”48 For example, where an 
interest payment is never taxed as income, the IRS is essentially losing 
whatever interest expense is deducted, because there is no 
corresponding tax liability from an increase in the payee’s gross 
income.49 
The regulations governing transfer pricing are perhaps the greatest 
examples of regulations that are aimed at preventing abuse and fraud 
by foreign related parties. Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of 
goods and services within a single organization.50 Serious tax issues 
arise when cross-border transactions are involved.51 For example, 
goods may be sold from one division to another, from one subsidiary 
to another, or from a parent to a subsidiary where the decisions as to 
the price affect the distribution of profits and losses amongst the 
different legal entities within the same organization.52 Although the 
use of transfer pricing in global corporations often has an honest and 
important purpose, it is particularly subject to abuse.53 Often it is in the 
best interest of the organization to arbitrarily select a price where the 
                                                 
46 Angus McDowell, The Chartered Minefield of U.S. Company Tax, June 27, 
1998, available at 
http://www.mcdowell.com/mcgeneral/a_misc/articles/art_uscomtax.htm (noting that 
Angus McDowell is the past president of the Association of Chartered Accountants 
in the United States). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 See I.R.C. § 482 (2006); Boeing Co v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 440-48 
(2003); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transfer_pricing. 
51 See I.R.C. § 482. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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highest profit margin occurs in a country with the most favorable tax 
structure.54 These types of transactions have led to the rise of transfer 
pricing regulations because governments seek to stem the flow of 
taxation revenue overseas.55 
For the purposes of U.S. tax liability, § 482 of the Code governs 
transfer pricing.56 Section 482 provides57: 
 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or 
businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not 
organized in the United States, and whether or not 
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, 
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits 
or allowances between or among such organizations, 
trades or businesses, if he determines that such 
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary 
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect the 
income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses. 
 
In certain cases, such as between special related parties “no deduction 
shall be allowed in respect of any loss from the sale or exchange of 
property, directly or indirectly, between persons” when the 
transactions occur between parties with certain relationships.58 These 
relationships include, among other, those between family members, 
                                                 
54 See I.R.C. § 482; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. U.S., 608 F.2d 445, 
449-52 (Cl. Ct. 1979). 
55 See generally I.R.C § 482. 
56 Section 482 of the Code authorizes the IRS to adjust the income, deductions, 
credits, or allowances of commonly controlled taxpayers to prevent evasion of taxes 
or to clearly reflect their income. The regulations under § 482 generally provide that 
prices charged by one affiliate to another, in an inter-company transaction involving 
the transfer of goods, services, or intangibles, yield results that are consistent with 
the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in 
the same transaction under the same circumstances. 
57 I.R.C. § 482 (emphasis added). 
58 I.R.C. § 267. 
10
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individuals and the corporations they control, the grantors or 
beneficiaries of a trust and its fiduciaries, and two corporations which 
are members of the same controlled group.59 The basis for these 
regulations stems from the ease of manipulation and the possibility for 
fraudulent transfers that would cause the financials of a company to 
look more favorable than they are.60 For example, if one wants to 
generate a loss to offset tax liability, by selling to one’s parent 
company for $80 stock purchased for $100, § 267(a)(1) will preclude 
the deduction of the loss because of the nature of the relationship.61 
This limitation on deductions for transfers between related parties 
protects against “sham transactions” and manipulations without 
economic substance.62 However, it should be noted that “there are 
often honest and important non-tax reasons for sales between related 
parties, so it [is] important to fairness to preserve [these transactions 
and] the pre-sale basis where loss on the sale itself is [not] recognized 
for tax purposes.”63 “A variant of this scheme applies to ‘controlled 
groups,’ that is, corporations with interlocking ownership as specified 
by statute.64 Instead of being disallowed under § 267(a)(1), the loss is 
‘deferred’ under § 267(f)(2) until one of two conditions pertains either: 
(1) until the property is transferred outside such controlled group and 
there would be recognition of loss under consolidated return 
principles; or (2) until such other time as may be prescribed in 
regulations.”65 These regulations, although preventing fraud and 
abuse, place a burden on American companies that are attempting to 
use related party transactions to compete in a global marketplace. 
Another example of the strict regulation of foreign related party 
transactions is the stringent requirements that corporations must 
                                                 
59 I.R.C. 267(a)(1), (b). 
60 See id.; McWilliams v. C.I.R., 331 U.S. 694, 700-701 (1947). 
61 Unionbancal Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 305 F.3d 976, 978 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
62 See McWilliams, 331 U.S. at 700-701. 
63 Unionbancal, 305 F.3d at 978-79. 
64 Id. at 979 (citing I.R.C §§ 267(b)(3), 267(f)(1), 1563). 
65 Unionbancal, 305 F.3d at 978-79. 
11
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adhere to if engaged in these types of transactions. Specifically, 
§ 6038(a) governs the reporting requirements on transactions with 
foreign related parties.66 This provision was enacted to impose a 
higher standard of reporting requirements on foreign controlled U.S. 
corporations and branches of foreign corporations.67 Section 6038(a) 
requires domestic corporations that are 25% foreign owned to furnish 
records to the IRS to justify transactions with foreign shareholders.68 
The penalties associated with non-compliance are extremely harsh, 
such that a corporation has no option but to comply with the 
requirements, even if in order to substantiate the transaction the 
company must produce books from all over the world.69 Companies 
are then forced to justify the expenses and transactions under the IRS’ 
“profitability” standard which determines the amount of tax that 
should be imposed based on a number of questions including: “would 
the financial and commercial arrangements have been the same”; if the 
entities had not been related, would the transaction have occurred; 
etc.70 This Code provision essentially grants the Secretary the broad 
authority to seek any information, even that tangentially related to a 
transaction, under the justification of preventing fraud and deceit. The 
ultimate purpose of the legislation is to provide the IRS with sufficient 
information to compute accurate transfer prices based on its economic 
model. However, the IRS can then replace the recorded book figures 
for transactions between related parties with the amounts that it 
chooses and in the case of insufficient records, it can choose almost 
any figure.71 
                                                 
66 I.R.C § 6038 (1998). 
67 ASAT, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 108 T.C. 147 (1997). 
68 Nissei Sangyo America Ltd. v. United States, 1995 WL 263473, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 247, at 1296-97 (1989), reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2766-67)). 
69 Angus McDowell, The Chartered Minefield of U.S. Company Tax, June 27, 
1998, available at 
http://www.mcdowell.com/mcgeneral/a_misc/articles/art_uscomtax.htm. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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There are several legitimate reasons to use interrelated 
transactions, such as accounting for time spent from the home office 
consulting with other divisions, transfers of materials, and services 
such as research and development.72 This level of regulation is a great 
burden on corporations, and requires extreme diligence (and expense) 
to fully comply.73 Foreign companies may see this regulation, in the 
context of the other regulations that impact corporate conduct as a 
deterrent to U.S. market entry or current U.S. market position. This 
amount of discretion and broad authority granted to the Secretary 
could have unforeseen consequences as corporations looking to 
streamline, decrease costs, and improve efficiency may take a close 
look or have a second thought before they enter or remain in the U.S. 
marketplace. 
 
III. THE VALIDITY OF REGULATION 1.267(A)-3. 
 
In Square D, the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of Reg. 
1.267(a)-3, which requires a taxpayer to use the cash basis method of 
accounting with respect to the deduction of interest owed to a related 
foreign party.74 This issue was a matter of first impression for the 
Seventh Circuit. In both its reasoning and decision, the Seventh Circuit 
relied heavily on the analysis presented by the Third Circuit, which 
decided a factually analogous case.75 The Seventh Circuit has reasoned 
that as a general matter, “ ‘[r]espect for the decisions of other circuit 
courts is especially important in tax cases due to the importance of 
uniformity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of another circuit 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. (noting that this new tax regime will have several costs associated with it 
including: the costs of the disruptions by IRS investigations; time spent reviewing 
records and obtaining additional information from old or international records; and 
costs of professional, legal and accounting advice will likely be significant as there 
may be a lot of transactions that could be characterized in many different ways). 
74 Square D Co. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
75 Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99 (3d 
Cir. 1996) 
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should be followed unless it is shown to be incorrect.’”76 “Although 
we are not bound by them, we ‘carefully and respectfully consider’ the 
opinions of our sister circuits.”77 
 
A. Square D 
 
Square D, an accrual taxpayer, was acquired by Schneider S.A., a 
French Corporation, in 1991.78 As a result of the acquisition, Square D 
borrowed additional funds and ended up with a four hundred million 
dollar debt to Schneider.79 It accrued interest to Schneider in 1991 and 
1992 but it did not deduct these amounts in its tax returns for those 
years.80 Square D paid the accrued interest on these loans in 1995 and 
1996.81 Since Schneider was a resident of France, the interest paid to it 
by Square D was exempt from U.S. tax under the United States-France 
income tax treaty.82 However, after an audit of Square D’s financials, 
the Internal Revenue Service charged Square D for the deficiencies 
evidenced in its 1991 and 1992 tax returns.83 Square D informally 
requested that it be permitted to deduct the accrued amounts in order 
to offset the deficiency.84 The Tax Court denied the allowance of a 
deduction based on the interest expense accrued and upheld the 
                                                 
76 Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 40 
F.3d 224, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 527 
F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
77 330 W. Hubbard Rest. Corp. v. United States, 203 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
78 Id. (noting that Schneider acquired Square D by means of a hostile takeover, 
initially acquiring Square D through a special purpose entity that was later merged 
into the Schneider corporation). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 1967 Double Taxation Convention, U.S.-Fr., Article 10(1), Oct. 27, 1979, 
RIA TAXT 2168. 
83 Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 118 T.C. 299, 300-03 
(2002) 
84 Id. 
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validity of the Regulation.85 It is these deficiencies that are the subject 
of this analysis as Square D challenged the deficiencies and argued 
that it should be allowed to deduct the interest accrued to Schneider in 
1991 and 1992, thus eliminating any deficiency.86 
The first challenge that Square D presented was to the validity of 
Regulation 1.267(a)-3, arguing that this regulation was unreasonable 
given the clear meaning of the language of § 267(a)(2)-(3).87 Square D 
argued that the language of § 267(a)(3) limited the power of the 
Secretary to only promulgate a regulation that applied the “matching 
principle” articulated in § 267(a)(2) in the context of foreign related 
parties.88 Square D’s French parent company, Schneider, was not 
subject to U.S. tax liability and had no U.S. tax liability or method of 
accounting for tax liability to match against.89 Square D argued that 
the Secretary’s regulation, mandating use of the cash basis method of 
accounting, was beyond the scope of authority granted to the Secretary 
under the plain language of the Code.90 
The issue presented involved the Seventh Circuit’s determination 
of the validity of a regulation; hence, the analysis of the court was 
governed by a two-step Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. inquiry.91 First, a determination whether the 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 742-43 
(7th Cir. 2006)  
87 Id. 
88 Id. (noting that section 267(a)(2) generally provides that in the case of 
certain related parties, if the person to whom the amount is owed, as a result of that 
person’s method of accounting, is not required to include that item in income (unless 
actually paid), then the person who owed the amount cannot deduct it from their 
income tax liability until it is includable by the recipient of the income). 
89 See id. 
90 Id. at 743. 
91 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). A Chevron analysis requires a court to first ask 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and if 
Congress’ intent is clear from the plain language of the statute the inquiry must 
cease. However, if the court concludes that Congress has not directly addressed the 
issue or that the statute is ambiguous, then the court must determine whether the 
agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. 
15
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plain meaning of the relevant Code provisions clearly support or 
oppose the validity of the regulation; and second, if the plain meaning 
is either silent or unclear the Court must evaluate the reasonableness 
of the regulation in light of the language, overall structure, intent and 
purpose of the statute.92 However, under Chevron, “when reviewing an 
agency’s regulatory implementation of a statute, [the court] look[s] 
first to the intent of Congress” and only if that intent is unclear is it the 
duty of the court to determine if the regulation is a reasonable 
interpretation, while giving deference to the Commissioner’s 
interpretation.93 
 
 1. Plain Language of the Statute 
 
The Seventh Circuit, acting under a Chevron analysis, determined 
that the Code supported the Regulation.94 The court declined to look at 
the Code provisions in a vacuum, rather reading the provisions 
together in order to ascertain the plain meaning.95 One of the 
fundamental canons of statutory construction is that a statute should be 
construed to give meaning to all provisions and that on the whole no 
clause or word should be rendered void, insignificant or redundant.96 
Under Chevron, all words should be read in context.97 Therefore, if, 
§ 267(a)(3) merely authorized the Secretary to mechanically 
implement, with no modifications or alterations, the provisions of 
§ 267(a)(2) to foreign related parties it would be redundant given that 
                                                 
92 See id. at 843. 
93 Square D, 118 T.C. at 307 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). 
94 Square D, 438 F.3d at 745 
95 Id. When ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, the court must look to 
the statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a 
whole. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 
(1988). 
96 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004); 
Cole v. U.S. Capital Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2004). 
97 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) 
(citations omitted). 
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§ 267(a)(2) plainly does not distinguish between domestic and foreign 
related parties and thus logically applies to both.98 Section 267(a)(2) 
already applied to both foreign and domestic parties, rendering 
§ 267(a)(3) “surplusage” unless it extends the meaning articulated in 
§ 267(a)(2).99 Moreover, § 267(a)(2) was enacted two years before 
§ 267(a)(3), which can be interpreted as shaping the provisions already 
included in the Code.100 The inclusion of the provision, given the 
statutory scheme as a whole, suggests that § 267(a)(3) has a distinct 
meaning which is ambiguous and dictates a further analysis.101 
 
2. Legislative History 
 
In Square D, because the provisions were ambiguous, in order to 
determine the validity of the regulation the Court looked to whether 
the interpretation set forth by the Secretary was a reasonable one.102 
With regard to the legislative history surrounding § 267(a)(2) the 
Court noted that the Congressional climate was focused on attempting 
to restrain fraud and abuse in related party transactions as these types 
of transactions were easily manipulated by parties to shield profits and 
avoid tax liability.103 Under the precursor to I.R.C. § 267(a)(2), 
Congress imposed an extremely strict limitation on interest 
                                                 
98 Square D, 438 F.3d at 745 (explaining that § 267(a)(3) grants the Secretary 
the discretion to issue regulations to apply the matching principle in cases where the 
person to whom the payment is made is not a United States person). 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 746. 
101 Id. at 745. 
102 In cases where “Congress has made an express delegation of authority to 
enact regulations, ‘[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Id. (citing 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).  
103 Square D, 438 F.3d at 746 (citing I.R.C § 267(a)(2) (previously Revenue 
Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377 §301(c) which became § 267(a)(2) in 1954)). 
17
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transactions between related parties.104 The initial enactment of 
§ 267(a)(2) “permanently disallowed deductions for . . . interest 
accrued during the taxable year but not paid within two and one-half 
months after the close of the year if the payee was related to the 
taxpayer and, because of the payee’s method of accounting, the payee 
did not include the accrued interest in its income.”105 However, 
Congress amended § 267(a)(2) to include the “matching principle” to 
remedy the unduly harsh results that occurred as a result of the 
permanent disallowance of deduction.106 When related taxpayers 
attempt to deduct interest, especially under different accounting 
methods, it is nearly impossible to monitor when payments are 
actually made if the interest is accrued and the actual payments are not 
made until several years later.107 This makes the job of the IRS 
practically impossible and allows for companies to deduct for interest 
payments that potentially are never paid.108 
The legislative history also indicates that not only was Congress 
concerned with the monitoring and compliance nightmare that could 
easily ensue, but also with the ease with which taxpayers could engage 
in “phantom transactions” that led to deductions for payments that 
were either never made or manipulated in order to minimize liability 
in a high tax year.109 The general purpose of the present § 267(a)(2) 
was clear: it was intended “to prevent the allowance of a deduction 
                                                 
104 Under the 1937 law, Congress refused to allow a deduction for accruing an 
interest obligation to a related party; rather in order to apply the deduction, the payor 
had to actually pay the interest within approximately the same year as the accrual. Id.  
105 Id.; Brief for the Appellant at 3, Tate & Lyle, In. v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue Serv., No. 95-7523 (3d Cir. Sep. 1995)) (citing H. Rep. No. 75-1546, 
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 704, 724-25) (noting that “the rule was adopted 
because Congress found that some accrual taxpayers were claiming deductions for 
amounts owed to related parties as accrued, but thereafter never paid the amounts so 
accrued). 
106 Brief for the Appellant at 18-19, Tate &. Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue Serv., No. 95-7523 (3d Cir. Sep. 1995). 
107 H.R. Rep. No. 75-1546 (1937), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 704, 724-
25. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. 
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without the corresponding inclusion in income.”110 When Congress 
revisited this subject two years later it promulgated § 267(a)(3) which 
requires the Secretary to “apply the matching principle of [I.R.C. 
§ 267(a)(2)] in cases in which the person to whom the payment is 
made is not a United States person.”111 
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning 
articulated by the Third Circuit in Tate & Lyle, indicating that 
Congress envisioned this provision to cover circumstances beyond an 
accounting method mismatch, and to cover circumstances where the 
foreign related party was not subject to U.S. tax liability.112 The 
Seventh Circuit was persuaded by the Committee Reports that 
Congress clearly intended and anticipated that the Code would cover 
situations in which the cash basis accounting method would govern 
even when there was no mismatch in accounting systems because the 
foreign related party is not subject to U.S. tax liability.113 In light of 
the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit’s determination was based 
on whether the Regulation was reasonable in light of the overall 
structure and purpose of the Code.114 Based on the Committee notes, 
and in light of the overall fraud-prevention purpose of the provisions, 
the Seventh Circuit held that the Commissioner’s decision to enact the 
Regulation was reasonable despite the fact that it extended beyond 
situations involving an accounting mismatch and included transactions 
                                                 
110 H.R. Rep. No. 98-432 (II) at 1025 (1984) reprinted in 1984 (vol. 3) 
U.S.C.C.A.N 697, 1205 (widening the scope of the provision to address all 
payments, not just interest payments, between related parties with different 
accounting methods). 
111 I.R.C. § 267(a)(3). 
112 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99, 105 (3d 
Cir. 1996); see also H.R. Rep. 99-426 at 939 (1985) reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 
2) at 959; S. Rep. No. 99-313 at 959 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 (Vol. 3) at 959 
(articulating a situation where the foreign parent was not subject to U.S. tax liability 
but provided services to a U.S. company and thus the U.S. company was required to 
use cash basis accounting).  
113 Square D Co. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 747 
(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Tate & Lyle, 87 F.3d at 105; H. Rep. 99-426, at 940, 1986-3 
C.B. (Vol. 2) at 940; S. Rep. 99-313, at 960, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol.3) at 960). 
114 Square D, 438 F.3d at 747. 
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where the foreign related party was not subject to U.S. tax liability.115 
Further, given the history of manipulation of interest payments 
between related parties, the Seventh Circuit determined that the 
Commissioner’s decision to treat interest differently was well within 
his purview and consistent with congressional intent.116 
 
B. Tate & Lyle and the Tax Court’s Holding of the Invalidity of 
Treasury Regulation 1.267(a)-(3) 
 
Although the only circuits to address this issue have subscribed to 
the interpretation articulated by the Seventh Circuit, the Tax Court in 
Tate & Lyle held that the Regulation was an invalid exercise of the 
authority granted by § 267(a)(3) of the Code.117 The foundation for 
this holding is based in the plain language of the Code.118 
The Tax Court recognized that it must “ordinarily defer to the 
regulation if it implements the congressional mandate in some 
reasonable manner.”119 Section 267(a)(2) of the Code provides 
generally that a taxpayer may not deduct any amount owed to a related 
party until it is includible in the payee’s gross income if the 
mismatching occurs because the parties use different methods of 
accounting.120 Although the Code does not explicitly define the term 
“method of accounting” that term has the common usage to indicate 
the cash basis method, the accrual method, or some combination of the 
methods.121 Following this logic, a method of accounting is only 
applicable to determine when an item is includable in gross income; 
consequently, if the item is excluded from the entity’s gross income 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 666 
(1994). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (citing United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)). 
120 Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 666. (emphasis added). 
121 Id. 
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altogether, there is no method of accounting of which to speak.122 
When the interest owed is not includable in gross income because, for 
example, it was excluded from tax liability, such as in the case of a 
treaty, then there is no method of accounting and the regulations are 
not applicable to it.123 The plain language of the code is clear; the 
statutory mandate in § 267(a)(3) is that it “applies the matching 
principle of paragraph (2).”124 There is no reason to go beyond the 
language of the statute and engage in an exploration of the legislative 
history because the language clearly does not permit the Secretary to 
promulgate Regulations that exceed the scope of the “matching 
principle” to accounting methods as is articulated in § 267(a)(2).125 
The Secretary is not permitted to promulgate regulations that would 
alter the clear statutory scheme of the Code.126 Rather, the authority of 
the Secretary is limited in scope to filling gaps in the Code and setting 
forth regulations that clarify the implementation of the Code.127 The 
Regulation as issued, which does not allow a taxpayer to accrue and 
deduct interest owed to a foreign related party, is beyond the mandate 
of the statutory authority, and is thus, invalid.128 
The Tax Court addresses the argument that the Secretary’s 
justification is based on an attempt to analogize to provisions 
governing the original issue discount (“OID”).129 The Court 
hypothesizes that the goal of the Regulation was to treat interest 
deduction in the same way that deductions attributable to the original 
                                                 
122 Id. at 669.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 670. 
126 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 
843-44 (1984); Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (noting that the deference given to 
Treasury Regulation is based in the fact that Congress has delegated the task of 
administering tax laws to the Secretary and thus the choice among reasonable 
alternatives is his). 
127 Id. 
128 Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. 656, 672 (1994). 
129 Id. at 671. 
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issue discount are treated.130 However, the Tax Court adheres to the 
plain language and distinguishes the treatment of OID because there is 
no language or provision that requires for the expansion of the reach of 
the regulations beyond the matching principle articulated in 
§ 267(a)(2) interpretation.131 The administrative authority conferred on 
the Secretary is only to fill gaps; therefore, the Regulation as issued is 
beyond the scope of that authority and contrary to the plain language 
of the Code. 
Although not addressed by the Tax Court, the Regulation could be 
seen to place accrual taxpayers that engage in transactions with related 
foreign parties at a disadvantage vis-à-vis taxpayers in similar 
situations but dealing with a domestic related party. The primary 
justification for the “matching principle” is so that there is a balance 
between the deduction taken on interest paid and additional tax 
liability recognized on interest income.132 However, when the income 
is not included in payee’s gross income, the concerns from the IRS of 
balancing tax liability seems to diminish because the income will 
never generate U.S. tax revenue.133 
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE 
FOLLOWED BY OTHER COURTS 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold the validity of the 
Regulation is correct and should be followed by other jurisdictions. 
However, from the absence of many key arguments and the limited 
rationale expounded by the Seventh Circuit, the basis for the decision 
involved too much deference to the Third Circuit decision and the 
authority of the Secretary. 
                                                 
130 Id.; I.R.C. § 163(e)(3). 
131 Internal Revenue Code § 163(e)(3) provides that no deduction for original 
issue discount on a debt instrument held by a related foreign person shall be allowed 
until paid. 
132 Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 660-61. 
133See id. 
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The tax context is unique, and admittedly has the need for 
uniformity. Although deference is an important factor to consider, it is 
not controlling and the Seventh Circuit must reason its decision based 
on the arguments presented as opposed to merely following a like 
interpretation from another circuit. Yet, despite the deficiencies in the 
court’s reasoning and rationale, the decision was substantively correct. 
The Tax Court in Tate & Lyle read the definition of “matching 
principle” too narrowly. The Tax Court seems to confuse the 
“matching principle” with the specified reason or cause for a 
mismatch.134 Practically, § 267(a)(2) triggers the correction 
contemplated by § 267.135 The provision articulated in § 267 is 
logically read to indicate that mismatches in federal income tax 
reporting, including accounting for interest expense and income are to 
be avoided.136 The language of the provision indicates that it is not 
aimed at remedying the reason that the mismatch occurred, but rather 
remedying the effects of the mismatch.137 In terms of the domestic 
taxpayers contemplated under § 267(a)(2)(A), given that both 
taxpayers are domestic related parties it is obvious that the only way 
that a mismatch could occur is because of different accounting 
methods, as both parties are subject to the U.S. tax liability and 
governed by the Code, meaning that they must utilize an approved 
accounting method.138 However, the “specified reason or cause for a 
mismatch (namely, a difference in accounting method) that triggers 
corrections under § 267(a)(2) is not a part of the ‘matching 
principle.’”139 Rather, the mismatch represents the “trigger” for the 
                                                 
134 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 680-81 
(1994) (Swift, J. dissenting). 
135 Id. 
136See I.R.C § 267; e.g., Albertson’s Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 42 
F.3d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1994)(noting that generally the point of the “matching 
principle” as used in § 404 is to prevent one party from taking a deduction for 
payment until the other party includes the payment in its income, and is therefore 
taxed on it). 
137 See I.R.C § 267; Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 680-81 (Swift, J. dissenting). 
138 See Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 680-81 (Swift, J. dissenting). 
139 Id. 
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matching principle that would result in a correction.140 Congress, in 
1986, added § 267(a)(3) in recognition of the fact that when domestic 
and foreign parties are involved in a transaction, mismatches occur for 
reasons other than a difference in accounting systems.141 Congress 
added § 267(a)(3) to remedy the effects of mismatches that are 
triggered by circumstances other than a difference in accounting 
methods.142 For example, a treaty would be a reason or cause for a 
mismatch and would be within the authority of the Secretary to 
determine the appropriate remedy and action.143 Applications of 
treaties, such as the U.S.-France tax treaty, were entered into to 
prevent double taxation (that is taxation on the same transaction by 
two governments). In this case, the interest income will be taxed by 
the country of France. In effect, the U.S. has acquiesced to the loss of 
certain tax revenues in exchange for a more efficient allocation of 
global resources and the influx of foreign capital. In order to give 
credence to this treaty, it should be treated as a “trigger” causing a 
mismatch and therefore, the matching principle should apply to 
transactions between domestic corporations and foreign corporations 
existing under a tax treaty. 
An argument ignored by the Seventh Circuit is that Congress did 
not relieve taxpayers from the requirements of § 267 where one of the 
related parties is tax-exempt, as in the case of a charitable 
organization, under § 501.144 It is inequitable that § 267 would apply 
to domestic parties engaged in transactions with tax exempt parties, 
but would not apply to domestic parties engaged with foreign tax 
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. (noting that Congress directed in § 267(a)(3) that the Commissioner, by 
means of legislative regulations, provide other causes of mismatches between 
domestic and foreign related parties to trigger the provisions of § 267); Brief for the 
Appellant, supra note 106, at 10. 
143 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 10 (stating that Judge Swift 
considered the treaty-mandated an accounting method in and of itself). 
144 See I.R.C. § 267(b)(9). 
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exempt parties.145 In both cases the payee will never be including the 
payment in its gross income, and will never be subject to U.S. tax 
liability. From a policy perspective, there is no justification that the 
reason why income is not taxed should make any difference.146 
Whether income is “tax-exempt” as in the case of a charitable 
organization or is exempt by reason of a tax treaty is irrelevant.147 The 
“matching principle” is triggered wherever there is a mismatch, and 
the reason why the mismatch occurs is irrelevant to the ability of the 
Secretary to issue regulations. It naturally follows that the same 
standards should apply to these groups because the scenarios are far 
more analogous than two domestic corporations with different 
accounting systems. 
Another issue ignored by the Seventh Circuit, but that argues in 
favor of its decision, is the parallel interpretation between the 
Regulation and § 163(e)(3) with respect to original issue discount.148 
Section 163(e)(3) requires a taxpayer to use the cash basis method of 
accounting for deductions of original issue discount149 on debt 
instruments held by foreign related parties.150 These provisions were 
enacted to remedy the exact concerns that led Congress to enact 
§ 267.151 Both provisions were aimed at preventing abuse by taking 
tax deductions for payments never made.152 Further, the “definition of 
foreign related person” in § 163(e)(3) contains a direct reference to 
                                                 
145 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 679 (1994) 
(Halpern, J. dissenting) (noting that is difficult to see any reason why one tax 
exemption should be treated differently from another). 
146 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 37. 
147 Id. 
148 I.R.C. § 163 (e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3. 
149 “Original issue discount” is defined as the excess, if any, of the stated 
redemption price of a debt instrument at maturity over the issue price of the 
instrument. I.R.C. § 1273 (a)(1). 
150 Id. Note: this article will not address the validity of § 163(e)(3) or its 
accompanying Treasury Regulations. This article will only address this issue in 
relation to parallels and similarities with § 267. 
151 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 39. 
152 See id. 
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§ 267(b).153 By defining related parties in this fashion, it can be 
reasonably inferred that Congress envisioned in § 163(e)(3) and § 267 
a natural overlap in application and interpretation between these two 
provisions.154 One might argue that the absence of any reference to 
§ 163(e)(3) in the legislative history of § 267 indicated that Congress 
did not intend the provisions to parallel one another.155 The absence of 
a reference in no way indicates that Congress intended to prohibit the 
Secretary from issuing a similarly aimed regulation; it merely 
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to require such a rule.156 
Square D did not raise, and the Seventh Circuit did not address, 
the impact that the level of deference to administration regulation 
could have on the future viability of transactions with foreign related 
parties. 157 Although Square D made a non-discrimination claim, which 
was quickly dismissed by the Seventh Circuit, it never raised the 
                                                 
153 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 163(e)(3)). 
154 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 39. 
155 Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 671 
(1994). 
156 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 41. 
157 Square D argued in the alternative that Reg. 1.267(a)-3 conflicted with the 
Tax Treaty between the United States and France because it requires a U.S. taxpayer, 
owned by a foreign [French] corporation to use the cash basis method of accounting 
to deduct interest payment to its parent, rather than the more advantageous accrual 
method. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that this argument failed because the type of 
discrimination sought to be prevented was discrimination based solely on the foreign 
ownership of the foreign-owned person. However, in this case, the regulation did not 
dictate the use of the cash basis method based on the French ownership of Square D. 
Rather, the dictate was based upon the fact that the interest payments were rendered 
to a foreign party. Therefore, had Square D been owned by a domestic corporation, 
any interest payment to a foreign related party would still be subject to the rule 
putting Square D’s deduction on the cash basis method. The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that in order to violate the nondiscrimination clause in the treaty, the 
additional burden levied must be directed at a nationality. Hence, since all 
companies who engaged in transactions with foreign related parties resulting in 
payment of interest were equally subject to this provision, whether owned by a 
foreign or domestic parent company, there was no discrimination. Therefore, there 
was no violation by the Reg. 1.267(a)-3 of the non-discrimination clause of the 
Treaty. Square D, 438 F.3d at 747-48. 
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question of where the foreseeable scope of these regulations might 
end.158 In the Seventh Circuit’s holding, it indicated its propensity to 
defer to administrative regulation, without a full exploration of the 
arguments, under the justification of prevention of fraud.159 For 
example, in an effort to prevent fraud and ease the burden of tracking 
deductions, the next step might be to eliminate the ability of a taxpayer 
to take advantage of the interest deduction when the payee is any 
foreign party. Although this is an extreme example, given the current 
distrust of corporate America and prevalence of scandal, without an 
adequate check on administrative regulation, these regulations could 
easily exceed their intended scope. Reviewing courts are charged with 
conducting a thorough analysis to ensure that administrative regulation 
is reasonable. Absent such an analysis it is possible that the Secretary 
will exceed the scope of its authority and do more harm than good for 
American Corporations. 
However, in light of the much stricter regulations upheld affecting 
transactions with foreign related parties, the interpretation of the 
Regulation at issue in Square D is consistent with the deference 
applied to other similarly aimed regulations.160 Although the subject 
matter of these laws varies quite broadly over a spectrum of topics, 
they all share one common goal: to prevent fraud and abuse by 
corporations.161 Given the serious nature and consequences of these 
regulations, courts must hesitate before granting broad deference and 
latitude to the agencies charged with ensuring compliance. It is a very 
fine line between reasonable enforcement of these provisions as 
initially intended and allowing these regulations to be carried to 
illogical extremes, impairing American corporations by placing them 
on unequal footing in a global marketplace. Therefore, it is critical that 
reviewing courts engage in a thorough analysis of any administrative 
                                                 
158 Id. 
159 See id. at 747 (stating that although the use of the cash basis method may 
seem “counter-intuitive” it is justified by the potential to prevent “fraud and abuse by 
taxpayers). 
160 See, e.g., Boeing Co v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003); Tate & Lyle v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996). 
161 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163, 267, 446  
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regulation aimed at preventing fraud in taxation before granting 
deference to an administrative regulation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is no debate that adequate regulation of corporate 
transactions is important. Proof of this fact has never been more 
evident than in the past few years when the effects of corporate 
wrongdoing have been recognized at the greatest level. For the 
purposes of tax liability, related party transactions are one of the most 
commonly abused vehicles. 
Both the Seventh and Third Circuit have upheld the validity of the 
Regulation requiring a taxpayer to use the cash basis method of 
accounting to deduct interest payments to foreign related persons. This 
decision represents a trend toward greater regulation and discretion for 
the agencies charged with promulgating these regulations. Although 
these decisions should be narrowly construed and not used as 
precedent for sweeping deference to administrative regulation they 
were correctly decided. The burden that this regulation imposes is both 
necessary and mild in light of the context of other similarly aimed 
regulations. As such, the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Square D is 
correct and all other circuits addressing this narrow issue should 
follow the decision. However, the absence of extensive reasoning by 
the Seventh Circuit should not be read to indicate that, in the context 
of administrative regulation under the Code, all regulation is good 
regulation. 
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